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Attorney Liability Under the Federal
RICO Statute: A Call for Awareness in
the Absence of Reform
I. Introduction
The Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
statute' (RICO) remains the subject of much discussion. ' What be-
gan as an attempt to control organized crime' has evolved into some-
thing of a quite different nature." Reform continues to elude the stat-
ute's critics,' and therefore, the practicing attorney must be aware of
the statute's application to a client facing a RICO suit.'
RICO also poses issues that directly impact the attorney. The
most well-known and discussed provisions include possible fee forfei-
ture7 and criminal liability.8 Less well known is the potential for at-
I. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1989). State RICO statutes are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
2. Approximately 300 periodical articles have been published since December 1987 that
referred in some manner to RICO.
3. The proposition that Congress enacted RICO to curb organized crime is generally
accepted. The United States Supreme Court has stated that when enacting RICO "it was the
declared purpose of Congress 'to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
... " United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1980). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 524 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that
"private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against such defend-
ants, rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster." Id. at 499. The Court further
recognized that "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different
from the original conception of its enactors." Id.
5. See infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text. Reform efforts have failed in the 99th,
100th and 101st sessions of Congress.
6. A discussion of issues relating to the representation of clients facing either a criminal
or civil RICO action is beyond the scope of this Comment.
7. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, Under Advisement. Attorney Fee Forfeiture and the Su-
preme Court, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. III (1989); Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attor-
neys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights,
1987 Wis. L. REV. I (1987); Bruce J. Winnick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO
and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to
Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV. 765 (1989); Wendy E. Kestin, Comment, Attorney Fee Forfei-
ture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act: Pulling the Plug on Organized Crime, 38 EM-
ORY L.J. 1223 (1989); Stacy Levin, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees in RICO and CCE
Cases: A Denial of Due Process and the Right to Choice of Counsel, 74 IOWA L. REv. 249
(1988); John R. Russell, Comment, The Constitutionality of Attorney Fee Forfeiture Under
RICO and CCE, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1988); Tim Tracy, Comment, RICO and the
Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Removing the Adversary From the Adversarial System, 62
WASH. L REV. 201 (1987).
8. See Paul Cooper and Kay Rice, The Statutory Liability of Attorneys Under RICO,
53 INS. COUNSEL J. 549, 551 n.14 (1986) for a listing of criminal cases with an attorney as
defendant. Criminal liability is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Section 1963(a) reads in perti-
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torney civil liability under RICO.9 Attorney civil liability under
RICO has traditionally been overshadowed by more conventional
means of liability, including the Securities Act of 1933, ° the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934,11 and most important, negligence. 2
Thus, this Comment began with the twin goals of: 1) exposing
the inherent inappropriateness in using RICO as a vehicle for attor-
ney civil liability and 2) advocating radical reform of civil RICO to
protect the attorney. While advocating radical reform would have
provided an excellent intellectual challenge, research quickly indi-
cated that any significant legislative reform was uncertain. 13 Initial
research also indicated that a civil RICO action may be a potentially
powerful weapon14 in the hands of a plaintiff who has brought suit
against an attorney. Given these facts, the Comment's revised goal is
to address the potential for attorney civil liability under RICO with
the objective of creating an awareness to the problems RICO poses
for the attorney. Given the uncertainty of significant reform, 6 the
Comment takes the position that attorney awareness of potential lia-
bility is essential.
After a brief history of the civil remedy's development, the
nent part: "Whoever violates any provision of Section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racke-
teering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 1991).
9. Civil liability is provided by 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (1989). See infra note 23 for the
text of § 1964(c).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1989). See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Seaboard
Corp., 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982); In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool
Certificates Securities Litigation, 636 F. Supp. 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Seidel v. Public Service
Corp. of New Hampshire, 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C.N.H. 1985); Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F.
Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal. 1985). For a general discussion of attorney liability under the Securities
Act of 1933, see, e.g., Joseph L. Johnson, III, Note, Liability of Attorneys for Legal Opinions
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 27 B.C. L. REV. 325 (1986); Joseph Reece, Comment,
Attorneys Beware: Increased Liability for Providing Advice to Corporate Clients Issuing Se-
curities, 20 AKRON L. REV. 519 (1987).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 7861 et seq. (1989). See supra note 10 and Bush v. Rewald, 619 F.
Supp. 585 (D. Haw. 1985).
12. See generally Vanguard Production, Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1990);
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Ackerman v, Schwartz, 733 F. Supp.
1231 (N.D. Ind. 1989). Attorney liability for negligence is a matter of state law. An individual
with questions concerning negligence should refer to the controlling state law.
13. See infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text.
14. RICO as a civil litigation weapon derives much of its power from the treble damages
remedy provided by.§ 1964(c), as well as the stigma associated with the label "racketeer." See
Thomas F. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J. 56 (1989); Richard H. Rowe,
Trends in Potential Liability Under the Federal Securities Law for Rendering Legal Opinions
in Securities Transactions, 673 OPINIONS IN SEC TRANSACTIONS 1990 423. For an interesting
alternative to the current damages provision, see Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the
Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alternative Measurement of Damages Under Civil RICO,
33 VILL. L. REV. 239 (1988).
15. See infra notes 110-45 and accompanying text.
ATTORNEY LIABILITY AND RICO
Comment first analyzes the early civil RICO cases involving the at-
torney as defendant. This analysis is followed by an extensive discus-
sion of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co.,16 which did not involve a suit
against an attorney,17 but nevertheless opened the window to greater
attorney liability."8 Recent reform efforts are then discussed in the
context of their potential to impact attorney civil liability. Finally,
the current state of attorney civil liability under RICO is considered
with the purpose of creating a formula for attorney awareness. A
secondary theme throughout the Comment, and particularly in this
final section, is whether RICO is an appropriate vehicle for attorney
civil liability. By creating an awareness of the potential for civil lia-
bility, the Comment provides an attorney with the knowledge neces-
sary to avoid or minimize the consequences of a civil RICO action.
11. The Development of Attorney Civil Liability Under the RICO
Statute
A. The RICO Statute. Congress Provides a Private Civil Remedy
Under § 1964(c)
The federal RICO statute"9 was enacted in 1970 as Title IX of
the Organized Crime Control Act.2" There is general agreement that
the Congressional intent was to step up prosecution of organized
crime." Despite the criminal overtones of the statute,22 Congress
provided a private civil remedy as well.2" The legislative history indi-
cates that Congress added this private civil remedy "almost as an
16. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
17. Id. Sedima involved a suit by a Belgian corporation against an exporter and two of
its officers involved in a joint venture with the Belgian corporation. Id. at 482.
18. See Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 553. Cooper and Rice concluded that Sedima
opened the door to greater attorney liability under RICO. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at
553.
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Thomas F. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO, 75 A.B.A. J. 56 (1989). Harrison
states:
Back in the early 1970s, nearly everyone thought of RICO as a strictly criminal
statute. Congress' main concern was stepping up prosecution of the Mafia. Since
Congress couldn't make it illegal to belong to the Mafia (that would be an un-
constitutional "status offense"), it devised the extremely broad and now notori-
ous concept of "racketeering activity."
Id. at 59.
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1989). Section 1964(c) reads: "Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. For a discussion of the
"violations of Section 1962" requirement and the formulation of a civil complaint against an
attorney, see infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
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afterthought."24
While earlier versions of proposed RICO legislation contained a
private civil remedy, the bill actually passed by the Senate, Senate
Bill 30, limited civil remedies to injunctive actions by the United
States.25 Representative Steiger proposed the addition of a private
civil remedy when Senate Bill 30 came before the House Judiciary
Committee.26 Steiger proposed a private treble-damages remedy
"similar to the private damage remedy found in the anti-trust laws
. . . . [T]hose who have been wronged by organized crime should at
least be given access to a legal remedy. In addition, the availability
of such a remedy would enhance the effectiveness of Title IX's
prohibitions."27 The American Bar Association had also proposed a
private treble damages remedy based upon the concept of § 4 of the
Clayton Act.
28
The committee approved the amendment despite the dissent of
three members.2 9 These members felt the treble damage provision
would be maliciously used against business compeitors.3 0 When the
bill reached the House floor, a proponent of the bill described it as
"another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use
against organized criminality. '3' The House rejected a proposal to
add a private treble-damages remedy to protect defendants injured
by malicious private suits32 and passed the bill as amended.33 With-
out seeking a conference, the Senate adopted the bill as amended in
the House. 4
24. Harrison, supra note 21, at 59. Harrison concluded his comments on RICO's history
by noting that "[tlhe private treble-damages provision, inspired by the comparable provision in
the antitrust laws, was added, almost as an afterthought." Harrison, supra note 21, at 59.
25. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-87 (19:35) (citing S. 1623, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a) (1969); S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967)).
26. See id. at 487 (citing Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970) (testimony of
Rep. Steiger) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 30].
27. See id. at 487 (quoting Hearings on S. 30, supra note 26).
28. See id. at 487 (citing Hearings on S. 30, supra note 26, at 543-44, 548, 559).
29. See id. at 487 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 187 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4083 [hereinafter House Report]).
30. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 487 (1985) (citing House Report,
supra note 29, at 187).
31. See id. at 487 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35287, 35295 (1970) (testimony of Rep.
Poff)).
32. See id. at 487 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35287, 35342-43 (1970)).
33. See id. at 488 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 35287, 35363-64).
34. See id. at 488 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 36294, 36296). Senator McClellan, who had
sponsored S. 30, endorsed the amended legislation while it was still in the House. Id. (citing
116 CONG. REC. 25190, 25190-91). McClellan commented that the treble-damages remedy
would be "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of organized crime in our
economic life." Id.
ATTORNEY LIABILITY AND RICO
Thus, Congress gave birth to the private civil remedy available
under RICO. This private civil remedy was only available to persons
injured in their business or property by reason of a violation of §
196 2 .11 Section 1962 contains a description of prohibited activities, 6
and its interpretation depends on the extensive definitions provided in
§ 1961.37
During the first ten years of RICO's existence, its application
conformed to the expectations of Congress," and attorneys could
practice law free from the fear of civil liability.39 Nevertheless, the
cloud threatening attorney liability loomed on the horizon. The views
expressed by Representatives John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and
William Ryan that RICO runs amuck, embodies poor draftsman-
ship, and employs both abusive and potentially abusive penalties"'
would prove prophetic.
B. The Early Cases Involving Attorneys as Defendants: 1980-1985
The number of civil RICO actions increased dramatically
around 1980.41' Along with this rise came the first civil RICO suits
brought against attorneys."2 One of the first cases was Crocker Na-
tional Bank v. Rockwell International Corp."' In Crocker National
Bank, a bank had purchased several investment packages marketed
by a leasing company through Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc."
The investment package was issued by the leasing company to fi-
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1989).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1989).
37. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) provides that "[lilt shall be unlawful for any per-
son through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate, or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. §
1962(b) (1989). Section 1961 contains definitions of "racketeering activity," "pattern of rack-
eteering activity," and "unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1989). The courts' application of
these definitional terms is the source of RICO's evolution.
38. Harrison, supra note 21, at 59.
39. Of course, criminal liability under RICO was a possibility. Cooper and Rice, supra
note 8, at 551 & n.14. Cooper and Rice noted that "lawyers who steered clear of bribery and
other criminal activity were relatively safe from RICO charges." Cooper and Rice, supra note
8, at 551.
40. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007, 4081.
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.l (1985). The United States
Supreme Court noted that of 270 district court RICO decisions prior to 1985, "only 3% were
decided through the 1970's, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in
1983, and 43% in 1984." Id. See also Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 550 n.7.
42. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 551-52. Accountants have also become potential
targets of civil RICO actions. See, e.g., In re Reach, McClinton and Co., 102 B.R. 381
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddy, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
43. 555 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
44. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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nance a lease of computers to Rockwell International Corporation. 5
Unfortunately, the leasing company went bankrupt before the bank
recovered its investment. 6
Seeking to recover claimed damages of approximately seventeen
million dollars, the bank brought suit against Lehman Brothers,
Rockwell, and the law firm that acted as legal counsel to the leasing
company."7 The bank alleged several causes of action, including vio-
lations of RICO."8 Each defendant moved to dismiss the RICO
claims. 9 The defendants claimed that dismissal was proper because
the bank had failed to allege a nexus to organized crime or miscon-
duct typical of organized crime, a distinct injury arising from the
predicate acts, and an anticompetitive injury.50
The court rejected the defendants' first assertions by reasoning
that Congress did not intend to limit RICO's application to only per-
sons connected with organized crime51 or racketeering activities. 2
The court next rejected the notion that a distinct injury is required.
Finally, the court rejected the notion that civil RICO applied only to
anticompetitive injury, holding that harm to legitimate businesses
was also a congressional concern. 53 Finding that the bank sufficiently
alleged the existence of at least one enterprise, the required acts of
racketeering, and damages as a proximate cause of the defendants'
actions,54 the court did not dismiss the bank's RICO claims. 55
The significance of this failure to dismiss should be readily ap-





49. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
50. Id. at 49.
51. Id. (citing U.S. v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975)).
52. Id. (citing U.S. v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court
noted that:
RICO prohibits "any person" involved in an "enterprise" engaged in interstate
commerce from participating in the enterprise's affairs through a "pattern of
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). An enterprise is any legal entity or
"group of individuals associated in fact." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). An enterprise
has engaged in a pattern of racketeering if it has committed two acts of racke-
teering in ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Acts of racketeering, include securities
fraud, wire fraud, and fraud involving use of the mails. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B).
Treble damages are available to "any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of" 18 U.S.C. § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id.
53. Id.
54. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
(citing Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Sec. 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947).
55. Id. at 50.
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jury, settlement may become the only realistic option.56 In Crocker
National Bank, the attorney was fortunate that several other solvent
defendants remained in the litigation.5 7 The lesson from Crocker Na-
tional Bank: The attorney was no longer immune from a civil RICO
suit. Unfortunately, the court chose not to describe the specific alle-
gations against the attorney so an understanding of what conduct by
the attorney precipitated the RICO action is not discernible. 8 Fur-
ther, the approach to RICO by the court in Crocker National Bank
was by no means the uniform approach across the federal court
system.5
The federal courts differed greatly regarding the extent of civil
RICO's limitations during the early 1980s." Specifically, the courts
differed on whether a plaintiff had to allege a racketeering injury;6'
whether a defendant must have been criminally convicted on the un-
derlying predicate offenses before a civil suit was possible; 62 whether
RICO required a nexus between the challenged activity and organ-
ized crime 3 and; whether the enterprise was required to be separate
from the liable person. 64 Many courts used these limitations to halt
the evolution of RICO and limit its application to legitimate business
organizations.65 The Crocker National Bank case may well have
been dismissed in another circuit.66 Obviously, an attorney named as
defendant in a circuit applying extensive limitations was still rela-
56. Harrison, supra note 21, at 56. Harrison noted that "the threat of an unsympathetic
jury has pressured many defendants into settlement figures that were simply unheard of previ-
ously." Harrison, supra note 21, at 56.
57. Crocker Vat'l Bank, 555 F. Supp. at 48.
58. The court's discussion focused on the allegations required to maintain a civil RICO
action. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 555 F. Supp. at 49.
59. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
60. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 550.
61. Compare Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984) (rejecting the requirement of a separate racketeering injury), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)
with Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (requiring an
injury beyond that directly following from the predicate acts).
62. Compare Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting the requirement of a prior criminal conviction as a predicate to a civil
RICO action) with Grey v. Gruntal No. 84-5036, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1984) (requiring
a prior criminal conviction as a predicate to a civil RICO action).
63. Compare Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1984) (rejecting the requirement of a nexus to organized crime) with Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984) (requiring a nexus between the challenged activity
and organized crime).
64. Compare U.S. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982) (individ-
ual sought to be held liable must be separate from the enterprise), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105
(1983) with U.S. v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982) (individual sought to be held
liable need not be separate from the enterprise), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). See also
Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 550 & nn.8-1 1.
65. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 550.
66. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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tively insulated from civil liability.
Grey v. Gruntal67 provides an illustration of a court using exten-
sive limitations and the corresponding benefits to the attorney/de-
fendant. In Grey, a young widow with a small child brought suit
against her broker and attorney alleging fraudulent handling of her
securities account.6 8 The suit contained various causes of action in-
cluding RICO and legal malpractice claims against the attorney.69
The essence of the widow's complaint was that the broker and attor-
ney pursued a scheme to cause her financial harm by improperly
concentrating her portfolio in a few stocks on margin while omitting
to inform her of the risks inherent in their course of action. 70 The
attorney and the broker contended that nothing :more had occurred
than a decline in the stocks' value attributable to market forces.
7
1
The court dismissed the civil RICO claim because the widow failed
to allege the attorney's criminal conviction of two charges of racke-
teering activity72 and the widow failed to allege a distinct RICO
injury.73
This dismissal was based on the Second Circuit's decision in
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades74 and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.7" decided earlier in the same year. 76 The claim was dismissed
without prejudice, however, "in the event the United States Supreme
Court interprets RICO in a manner which would permit a civil
RICO claim to proceed on the facts as alleged in this case."
77
While Grey illustrates the limitations courts placed on the appli-
cation of civil RICO actions78 and the corresponding benefits to at-
torney-defendants, Grey also raises a broader and more fundamental
67. Grey v. Gruntal, No. 84-5036, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1984) (available on
Westlaw, 1984 WL 1344).
68. Id. at I.
69. Id. at 1-2.
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Id. at 4.
72. The Second Circuit required criminal conviction of the predicate acts as a prerequi-
site to civil liability. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. Grey v. Gruntal, No. 84-5036, slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1984). See also
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984).
75. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1984).
76. Grey v. Gruntal, No. 84-5036, slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1984).
77. Such a decision would be forthcoming. See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying
text.
78. For a further discussion of the limitations placed by court on the application of the
civil RICO action see Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982); Ralston v. Capper, 569
F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Mich. 1983); First Interstate Bank of Nevada, N.A. v. National Republic
Bank of Chicago, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 91, 944, at 90,929
(N.D. III. 1985); In re Federal Bank & Trust Co., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) § 91,565, at 98,871 (D. Or. 1984).
ATTORNEY LIABILITY AND RICO
issue. Is Grey a case where a scheming attorney manipulated an in-
nocent widow? Conversely, is Grey a case where a greedy plaintiff
attempted to fabricate a claim in order to take advantage of civil
RICO's treble damage remedy? Unfortunately, there are no answers
to these questions. If the attorney is the innocent victim, the poten-
tial for attorney civil RICO liability clearly appears to exceed legis-
lative intent with the potential restrained only by judicial interpreta-
tion.79 However, should the attorney actually be guilty of the scheme
described by the widow, then civil RICO liability, although arguably
beyond the original intent of Congress in enacting RICO,80 would
not be unwarranted or unjustified.
This theme-attorney as villain versus attorney as victim-must
pervade any meaningful consideration of the attorney as defendant
in a civil RICO suit. Regardless of whether the attorney was villain
or victim, the federal courts' unwillingness to extend civil RICO lia-
bility protected the attorney from liability in many circuits. 81 This
protection was short lived as the United States Supreme Court
would open the window to attorney liability by rejecting these inter-
pretations of RICO. 8
C. Rejection of the Limited Interpretation of the Civil RICO
Provision
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,8" the United States Supreme
Court addressed the limitations various circuits were placing on
RICO's use in civil actions.84 The case involved a dispute between
two corporations, Sedima and Imrex, that had undertaken a joint
venture.85 Under an agreement, Imrex was to provide Sedima with
electronic components ordered by buyers through Sedima. a8 After in-
itial success with the arrangement, Sedima became conce'rned that
Imrex was presenting it with inflated bills.8 7 Sedima brought a civil
79. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial limitation.
80. See supra notes 19-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of
the civil RICO remedy.
81. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
83. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
84. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486 (1985). See supra notes 61-64
and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitations imposed by the different circuit
courts.
85. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 484.
86. Id. at 484.
87. Id. Sedima believed that Imrex was using these inflated bills to cheat Sedima out of
Sedima's full entitlement under the agreement. Id.
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suit against lmrex8" that included civil RICO claims.89
The suit was dismissed by the district court which held that the
injury required by § 1964(c) was either a racketeering injury "differ-
ent in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of
racketeering activity""0 or a competitive injury.9" The district court
dismissed Sedima's RICO claims, ruling that Sedima did not allege
a distinct RICO injury.92 The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed on this ground and also found the complaint defective
for failing to allege that the defendants had been criminally con-
victed of the predicate acts.93
The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision, re-
jecting both requirements imposed by the Second Circuit.94 The
Court first addressed the contention that a civil action could proceed
only after a criminal conviction. 5 The Court examined the history of
the civil RICO action,9 6 the statutory language itself, 97 and policy
considerations98 before concluding that no support existed for such a
requirement.
The Court next considered the contention that an allegation of a
separate racketeering injury was required by the statute.99 The
Court considered the statutory language and found no basis for an
additional "racketeering injury" requirement.' Rather, the Court
concluded that "where the plaintiff alleges each element of the viola-
tion, the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predi-
cate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern."101
88. Id.
89. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). Two counts of the civil
RICO suit alleged violations of § 1962(c) based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. The




93. Id. at 485.
94. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486, 500 (1985).
95. Id. at 488-93.
96. Id. at 489-91. The court found that the only specific reference in the legislative
history was an objection that the treble-damages provision was too broad because a conviction
was not required. Id. at 490 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35342 (1970)). The court concluded that
if Congress had intended to impose the requirement of a criminal conviction, this intent would
at least be evident from the legislative history. Id.
97. Id. at 488-89. The court dismissed the Court of Appeals' contention that the term
"violation" in § 1964(c) implied conviction. Id.
98. Id. at 492. The court concluded without explanation thai a civil RICO proceeding
left no greater stain than some other civil proceedings (the court declined to name these other
proceedings). Id.
99. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493-500 (1985).
100. Id. at 495, 500.
101. Id. at 497.
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The Court recognized that RICO had evolved into something
quite different than what Congress intended 10 2 and also recognized
that most actions were being brought against respected businesses. 103
Nevertheless, the Court found that use against respected businesses
allegedly engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct was an insuffi-
cient reason to assume that the provision was being misconstrued. 104
The Court further found that any defect inherent in the statute was
the legislature's responsibility to correct.'05
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Sedima made it
clear that RICO's application was not limited to organized crime. 06
The Court also paved the way for greater application to attorneys by
rejecting both the criminal conviction and racketeering injury re-
quirements. Prior to Sedima, these requirements placed an added
burden on a plaintiff bringing a RICO action. Obviously, few attor-
neys are practicing law who have been convicted of two predicate
offenses listed in § 1961. As a result of the Sedima decision, concern
was immediately expressed over the increased exposure of attorneys,
as well as the possibility that potential RICO liability could discour-
age attorneys from effectively representing clients.'
0 7
III. Congressional Proposals for RICO Reform Fail in the 101st
Congress'08
The United States Supreme Court noted that RICO reform is a
102. Id. at 500. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
103. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
104. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
105. Id. at 500. The court stated that if suits against legitimate business were occurring
as a result of some defect, this defect was inherent in the working of the statute. Id. at 499.
The court found that RICO's application to situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
indicated breadth and not ambiguity. Id. (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
106. Id. at 499. Regarding the application of civil RICO, the court noted:
Instead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a
tool for everyday fraud cases brought against "respected and legitimate 'enter-
prises' " Ibid. Yet Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" enterprises. United States v. Turkette, supra. The former enjoy neither
an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences.
The fact that § 1964(c) is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in
a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason
for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.
Id.
107. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 553.
108. As this Comment went to press, a new bill, H.R. 1717, had been introduced in the
House. See H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). H.R. 1717 is essentially the same as
H.R. 5111, the House bill which failed in the 101st Congress. See infra notes 136-45 and
accompanying text for a discussion of H.R. 5111. H.R. 1717, as amended, makes one impor-
tant change from its predecessor, H.R. 5111: a plaintiff is presumed to meet civil RICO stan-
dards when the action involves a failed financial institution insured by the Federal Deposit
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congressional function, not a judicial function. 10 9 Unfortunately,
Congress has been unable to enact any legislation that would curtail
RICO's expansive reach.11 ° Heavy lobbying by a business coalition
including manufacturers, accountants, and securities dealers pressing
for reform continually meets with strong opposition from consumer
groups and state law enforcement organizations seeking to maintain
the status quo. 1 Recent legislation faced particularly strong opposi-
tion because these same consumer groups perceive current reform
efforts as a bailout for accountants and lawyers who, according to
these groups, facilitated the savings and loan scandal."1 2
A. The RICO Reform Act of 1989
The RICO Reform Act of 198913 was the Senate's reform bill
in the 101st Congress. This bill would have cut further into RICO's
current reach than its House counterpart. 14 The bill would have
eliminated automatic triple-damage civil RICO suits by private
plaintiffs unless the defendant had been convicted in a criminal rack-
eteering case.115 However, plaintiffs in several categories still could
have recovered actual damages plus punitive damages up to twice
the amount of the actual damages."' These categories primarily
would have involved plaintiffs injured in connection with investments
Insurance Corporation. See H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991). Despite this change,
opponents of H.R. 1717 are "invoking the scandal related to the Bank of Credit and Com-
merce International (BCCI), asserting that RICO as written provides needed remedies for
such wrongdoing." See Joan Biskupic, Panel Votes to Narrow Reach of Anti-Racketeering
Law, CONG. Q., August 3, 1991. Therefore, the future of H.R. 1717 is uncertain. Id. The
Senate has not acted on a counterpart measure to H.R. 1717. Id.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying tex t.
110. In addition to the failed attempt to revise RICO in the 101st Congress, attempts to
revise RICO failed in both the 99th and 100th Congresses. Telephone Interview with Bruce
Nicholson, Legislative Counsel, ABA Governmental Affairs (Oct. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Nich-
olson Interview I. For examples of these failed reform attempts, :;ee H.R. 5445, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986); S. 2907, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
111. Joan Biskupic, Bill to Revise Racketeering Law Advances in Judiciary Panel,
CONG. Q., June 30, 1990, at 2075 (noting that consumer groups and state law enforcement
agencies feel that the treble-damages civil RICO remedy is necessary in the fight against
white-collar crime); Kenneth Jost, Thrift Scandal Fails to Slow Bill to Limit Civil RICO,
CONG. Q. Sept. 22, 1990, at 3024-25.
112. Jost, supra note 11, at 3025 (quoting Pamela Gilbert of the Washington con-
sumer-advocacy group Public Citizen's Congress Watch).
113. S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
114. Jost, supra note 11, at 3024.
115. S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1989). Treble-damages were provided for in
proposed § 1964(c)(5)(A), which stated that the plaintiff "shall recover threefold the actual
damages to the person's business or property sustained by reason of such conduct, and the
costs of the civil action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from any defendant convicted of
a federal or state offense described in subparagraph (B)." Id.
116. Id.
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in securities or deposits in a financial institution. 117 A plaintiff seek-
ing to recover punitive damages would have had the burden of prov-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions
"were consciously malicious, or so egregious and deliberate that mal-
ice may be implied" ' from the defendant's conduct. 19
Senate Bill 438 also would have provided an affirmative defense
for defendants who could show that the actions were taken in good
faith and in reliance upon an "official, directly applicable regulatory
action, approval, or interpretation of law by an authorized Federal or
State agency in writing or by operation of law."' 120 Further, the bill
would have required that the terms "racketeer" and "organized
crime" be eliminated from the complaint unless the complaint al-
leged a crime of violence.12' "Racketeering activity" would have
been referred to as "unlawful activity"' 22 and "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity would have been referred to as "pattern of unlawful ac-
tivity."'12 3 The change in terms presumably would have eliminated
the stigma associated with the label "racketeer."' 2 4
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Bill 438 by a
twelve to two vote on February 1, 1990."5 One expert rated the
probability of passage as low, noting that the Senate appeared to be
awaiting the outcome of House Bill 5111 in the House before taking
further action.' 26 This opinion proved correct: the 101st Congress en-
ded without enactment of Senate Bill 438.127
If enacted in unedited form, Senate Bill 438 would have been a
tremendous improvement from the standpoint of attorney liability.
First, the label "racketeer" would have been effectively elimi-
nated.128 Despite the United States Supreme Court's statement to
the contrary, 2 " this term has an overwhelmingly negative connota-
tion. A law firm's most precious asset is an unblemished reputation
117. Id. See proposed § 1964(c)(2)(C) and related § 1964(c)(2)(B).
118. S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1989). See proposed § 1964(c)(2)(C).
119. S. 438. See proposed § 1964(c)(2)(C).
120. S. 438. See proposed § 1964(c)(7)(A).
121. S. 438. See proposed § 1964(c)(10).
122. S. 438. See proposed § 1964(c)(10)(B)(i).
123. S. 438. See proposed § 1964(c)(10)(B)(ii).
124. However, the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that a civil
RICO action leaves no greater stain than several other civil proceedings. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
125. Nicholson Interview I, supra note 110. See also Biskupic, supra note 11l, at 2075.
126. Nicholson Interview I, supra note I10.
127. Telephone Interview with Bruce Nicholson, Legislative Counsel, ABA Governmen-
tal Affairs (Nov. 18, 1991) (hereinafter Nicholson Interview II].
128. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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earned through years of dedicated service to clients. By eliminating
the racketeer label, Senate Bill 438 would have protected a firm's
reputation from unnecessary damage.
Senate Bill 438 also would have reduced the pressure to settle
by limiting treble damages to instances where the defendant has
been criminally convicted of a racketeering crime. 30 This limitation
effectively would have eliminated the treble damage remedy against
attorneys because few attorneys are practicing with the requisite
criminal conviction. Those attorneys with criminal convictions have
betrayed the high standards of the profession and arguably deserve
the greater penalty.' 3'
Plaintiffs generally would have been limited to actual damages
in cases where the defendant has no racketeering convictions.3 2 The
primary exception to this general rule would have occurred when the
defendant caused the plaintiff injury in an investment context."33
This investment exception would have been of particular concern
among attorneys, as a high percentage of civil RICO actions in
which the attorney is defendant occur in this context. 34 However,
Senate Bill 438 would have entitled plaintiffs to punitive damages
for up to twice the amount of actual damages only when the plaintiff
could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
actions were consciously malicious. 3 5 As discussed infra, the com-
plexity and nature of the investment context in which the attorney is
named as defendant would effectively preclude a finding of conscious
malice in most instances. Unfortunately for the attorney defendant,
the protection afforded by Senate Bill 438 was not forthcoming from
Congress.
130. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131. Even an attorney with a criminal conviction could not be the subject of a treble-
damages civil action unless the offense and subsequent criminal conviction were based "upon
the same conduct upon which the plaintiff's civil action is based[.]" S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 4 (1989). See proposed § 1964(c)(5)(B)(i).
132. Exceptions to this general rule would include suits based on an injury occurring in
connection with investments in securities or deposits in financial institutions. S. 438, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1989). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a description of
additional requirements that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have been required to
satisfy.
133. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. See also infra note 134 and accompa-
nying text.
134. Cooper and Rice, supra note 8, at 553. See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (1985) (noting that 40% of all civil RICO cases at the trial level
involve securities fraud).
135. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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B. The RICO Amendments Act of 1990
The House's attempt at RICO reform, the RICO Amendments
Act of 1990,111 took a different approach than that employed by the
Senate.137 The House bill provided a "gatekeeper approach" that
would have required a federal judge to dismiss a civil RICO suit
unless the plaintiff showed: 1) the triple-damages remedy was appro-
priate because of the magnitude of harm suffered by the plaintiff; 2)
the defendant was a major participant in the criminal conduct re-
sponsible for the injury; and 3) the remedy was "needed to deter
future egregious criminal conduct" by the defendant or others.' 8 Al-
ternatively, the plaintiff would have avoided dismissal by showing
that the defendant had been criminally convicted of a predicate
offense.' 9
The bill's sponsor, William J. Hughes, D-N.J., had stated that
the bill would prevent RICO abuses, but at the same time maintain
civil RICO "as a useful tool to combat widespread criminal activi-
ties." 40 Opponents countered that the "major participant in criminal
conduct" requirement shields accountants and lawyers from liabil-
ity. '4 These opponents neglected to consider that RICO's original
purpose was the reduction of organized crime. 4 These opponents
are correct, however, in their conclusion that attorney liability would
have become almost non-existent under House Bill 5111.
Although the Senate bill would have virtually eliminated pri-
vate-treble damage suits, the House bill would have arguably af-
forded the attorney more protection from liability. An attorney's
probability for liability would have remained unchanged under the
Senate bill, but the magnitude of such liability would have been
greatly reduced in most instances. Under the House bill, the
probability for liability itself would have been reduced because the
attorney sued under RICO usually has played the role of facilitator,
not the role of "major participant" in the criminal conduct.
136. H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
137. See generally Jost, supra note I 11.
138. See generally Jost, supra note 111. See H.R. 5111, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 5
(1990). These provisions are found in proposed § 1964(c)(3)(A) read in conjunction with pro-
posed § 1964(c)(3)(B)(ii). H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1990).
139. H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1990). This provision is found in proposed §
1964(c)(3)(B)(i). See id. § 5.
140. Jost, supra note I11, at 3024.
141. Paul M. Barrett and Neil Barsky, House Panel Backs Limits on RICO Suits,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1990, at B10 (quoting Pamela Gilbert of the Washington consumer-
advocacy group Public Citizen's Congress Watch).
142. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
96 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1992
The House Judiciary Committee approved the bill by voice vote
on September 18, 1990.143 The bill reached the House floor,144 but
was never voted on by the House. 145 The practicing attorney should
be aware of these reform attempts, but cannot rely on congressional
action for relief from potential RICO liability. Rather, the attorney
should consider civil RICO's evolution in conjunction with the more
recent developments in the case law and develop an awareness of the
potential for civil RICO liability. While certain considerations may
be unique to particular practice areas, several general principles ap-
ply to any attorney or firm.
IV. Awareness Is the Best Defense, But No Guarantee Against
Liability
A. A Formula for Awareness
Given the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sedima'
and the lack of congressional reform, attorneys find themselves ex-
posed to potentially ruinous liability.147 Attorneys must understand
the ease with which a plaintiff can formulate a RICO claim. In this
regard, a hypothetical posited by former Justice Marshall proves in-
sightful. 48 Although this hypothetical places the broker providing
investment advice in the role of defendant,' 49 the situation described
is analogous to that faced by the attorney practicing in the invest-
ment/securities area.
Imagine a customer who has purchased a security. 5 ° The cus-
tomer subsequently refrains from selling this security during a period
in which its market value is declining.' The customer then brings
suit, alleging that on two occasions the broker recommended by tele-
phone, as part of a scheme to defraud, that the customer refrain
143. Nicholson Interview 1, supra note 110. See also Jost, supra note 111, at 3024.
144. Nicholson Interview 1, supra note 110.
145. Nicholson Interview !1, supra note 127.
146. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See supra notes 83-105 and
accompanying text.
147. Some circuits apparently continue to limit the reach of civil RICO by focusing on
the "pattern requirement." Compare Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) (one
fraudulent scheme sufficient to attach liability) with Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693
F. Supp. 1259 (D. Mass. 1988) (law firm's activities in allegedly providing misleading tax
advice not sufficiently continuous to constitute pattern of racketeering activity where law firm
provided information in connection with one limited partnership).
148. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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from selling the security.' 52 Surprisingly, the customer has stated a
civil RICO cause of action.
153
The customer has alleged injury to his property "by reason of a
violation of Section 1962."'"" Presumably, the customer would at-
tempt to establish a violation of § 1962 by alleging that the broker
participated in the conduct of the brokerage firm's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 15 5 This racketeering activity would
be the two telephone conversations with the customer, which would
constitute wire fraud.156  The pattern of racketeering activity
5 7
would be the fact that the broker made at least two telephone
calls.158 Thus, the plaintiff has alleged all the elements of a civil
RICO cause of action.
15 9
While it is tempting to dismiss this hypothetical as an imagina-
tive academic exercise, recent cases indicate that a civil RICO ac-
tion is often constrained only by the creativity of the plaintiff's attor-
ney. 1 0  Further, civil RICO suits are not limited to attorneys
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 18 US.C. § 1964(c) (1989).
155. This allegation would satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
156. Wire fraud is a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1989). Former United
States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall has stated that the single most significant
reason for the expansive use of civil RICO is the inclusion of mail and wire fraud violations as
predicate acts. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
157. The United States Supreme Court has noted that while a pattern requires at least
two acts constituting racketeering activity, two acts may not be sufficient. Sedima, 473 U.S. at
496 n.14. The circuits still disagree on what will satisfy this pattern requirement. See supra
note 147 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the pattern requirement, see generally
William Dorigan and Alfred Edwall, A Proposed RICO Pattern Requirement for the Habit-
ual Commercial Offender, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (1989); Michael Goldsmith, RICO
and "Pattern.'" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship", 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971
(1988); Stephan W. Milo, Comment, The RICO Pattern After Sedima - A Case for Mul-
tifactored Analysis, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 73 (1989).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) provides that a pattern of racketeering activity requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity. See supra notes 147, 157 and accompanying text.
159. The reader should note that this hypothetical contains a simple fact pattern includ-
ing a plaintiff who has chosen only to allege a violation of § 1962(c). Given a more realistic
and more complex factual situation and an imaginative plaintiff who alleges violations of any
combination of § 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d) based in turn on any combination of the extensive
list of predicate acts in § 1961(1), the potential formulas for liability appear limitless. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-64 (1989).
160. Consider the following statement by District Judge Katz, discussing one particular
civil RICO claim against an attorney:
This case illustrates what happens when ordinary contract and professional mal-
practice claims are dressed in the costume of RICO. A simple claim that a
wealthy investor in real estate tax shelters and his difficult wife were frozen out
of future deals by a parvenu becomes an exaggerated struggle between good and
evil. A marginal claim that an overly busy lawyer out to get business neglected a
matter becomes a vast conspiracy between a lawyer and his client to retire on
the money of a rich investor. What is portrayed as the grand opera of racketeer-
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practicing in the investment and securities area as indicated by Vil-
lano v. Ward. 6'
In Villano, the plaintiff retained a law firm to pursue a dental
malpractice claim.162 The case went to a jury, which awarded the
plaintiff damages of $50,000.163 The plaintiff appealed this award,
claiming that the amount was insufficient."' When the jury award
was affirmed on appeal, the plaintiff refused to accept her share of
the judgment. 65 The plaintiff's law firm obtained its share of the
award by order of the New York Supreme Court.1 66 The plaintiff
then brought suit against the law firm alleging four separate claims,
including a civil RICO claim." 7 The RICO claim was based on alle-
gations that the law firm engaged in a scheme to trade off cases and
to force settlements for less than their worth. 1 8 While the RICO
claim was subsequently dismissed because the plaintiff failed to al-
lege the requisite injury,119 this case indicates the potential reach of
a civil RICO action used against a law firm or attorney. Any attor-
ney who uses a telephone or the mail in thecourse of practicing law
risks a civil RICO action by a disgruntled client.' 71 Clearly, Con-
gress did not intend or anticipate such use of FR'ICO.
17
1
This risk is further illustrated by Ikuno v. Yip,' 72 a case that
presents the attorney as defendant in the more familiar investment
context. 7 The plaintiff and other investors were shown an attractive
brochure advertising the benefits of investing with a particular com-
modities company.17' The plaintiff invested more than $70,000 in
ing turns into a dreary Chestnut Hill soap opera with thin jury questions.
Stainton v. Torantino, 637 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
161. Villano v. Ward, No. 86 Civ. 9926, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1987) (available
on Westlaw, 1987 WL 1.7644).




166. Villano v. Ward, No. 86 Civ. 9926, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1987).
167. Id. at 2.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 3.
170. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172. 912 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1990).
173. For additional discussion of the attorney as defendant in the investment/commer-
cial context, see Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Odesser,
the complaint alleged that the attorney had participated in a scheme to unlawfully wrest con-
trol of a company from its founder. Id. at 1309-11. The court did not grant the attorney's
motion to dismiss a RICO claim, finding sufficient allegations to support a claim based on a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Id. at 1317. See also Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp.
1231 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
174. Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1990).
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this company. 17 The commodities company turned out to be a phan-
tom corporation that subsequently discontinued operations. 176 Two
employees of the corporation pleaded guilty to unlawful selling of
commodities and the individual featured in the brochure as the com-
pany's chairman denied any knowledge of the company. 17  The
plaintiff brought suit against an attorney involved with the company
alleging a variety of claims, including civil RICO violations.
78
The attorney was responsible for the incorporation of the com-
pany in the state of Washington, 79 filed two annual reports, and ne-
gotiated a lease for the company.'80 Even though the attorney was
neither an officer or director of the company, the attorney signed his
name and listed his title as "Attorney of the Corporation" in a space
designated for an officer or director's signature. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to affirm
the district court's decision granting the attorney summary judgment
on the RICO claims.' The court first found that the attorney's fil-
ing of two annual reports evidenced a pattern of racketeering activity
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 83 The court
then considered the plaintiff's claim under § 1962(b) and found that
sufficient evidence existed to preclude summary judgment on the is-
sue of whether the attorney had control over the company. 4 The
court stated that "[the attorney] was the incorporator of [the com-
pany], negotiated a lease for it, signed its corporate reports in a
space designated for officers and directors of the corporation and
held himself out as the company's attorney."'86 The court also ruled
that the specific intent required to support the § 1962(c) 86 claim
was an inappropriate issue for adjudication on summary judgment as
the claim could be proven by circumstantial evidence.'
8 7
The Ikuno case illustrates several important points regarding
175. Id. at 308.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The plaintiff also obtained a state court judgment against the company and
caused the sheriff to levy execution on all the company's assets. Id.
179. Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 308.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 315.
183. Id. at 309.
184. Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 310 (9th Cir. 1990). Section 1962(b) makes it unlaw-
ful for an individual to acquire through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest in or
control of an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1989).
185. Ikuno, 912 F.2d at 310.
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1989).
187. Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir. 1990).
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attorney liability. First, an attorney cannot complain that RICO has
evolved into something fundamentally unfair and unintended by
Congress if the attorney is guilty of active fraud. Attorneys who be-
tray the high standards of the legal profession deserve such severe
condemnation and liability. Second, the attorney in the instant case
has no basis to-complain even if he was not an active participant in
the fraud. Assuming that the attorney completed the legal aspects of
his employment in a competent manner, the attorney still cannot ex-
cuse his failure to consider the business ramifications of his legal
representation. 88 The duty to provide a client with effective repre-
sentation should not include a right to ignore the ramifications of the
client's activities. Third, this case illustrates why meaningful reform
is so elusive. Cases such as Ikuno provide consumer protection
groups with a factual basis for opposing reform and overshadow
other cases involving abuse of civil RICO by plaintiffs.189
The attorney's best strategy to avoid liability is to develop an
understanding of the business ramifications surrounding representa-
tion of each client. Obviously, the attorney can then entirely avoid
situations such as Ikuno that clearly indicate a high probability of
liability. Further, the attorney can better handle marginal situations
where liability appears possible, but not probable, by extensively
documenting the role played in furthering the client's interests.
A good example of a marginal situation involving attorney rep-
resentation of an ostensibly legitimate business is found in Blake v.
Dierdorff.1 90 In Blake, the defendant attorneys and law firm helped
to organize a savings and loan and secure the necessary approvals
from bank regulators. 91 The law firm continued -to represent the sav-
188. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 77a-bbbb (1989), specifically provides due
diligence as an affirmative defense to those accused of violating that Act's provisions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (1989). An expert may assert due diligence as a defense if:
[H]e had after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a mate-
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading.
Id. The probability that any reform of RICO will lead to inclusion of a similar provision is
small because RICO's application is much broader than that of the Securities Act of 1933,
which may only be applied to those individuals dealing in certain securities. Each special inter-
est group victimized by RICO is unlikely to win congressional approval of an affirmative de-
fense provision tailored to that particular group's needs. Nevertheless, the potentially devastat-
ing effects of a civil RICO action indicate that an attorney should practice due diligence as a
practical matter whenever representation occurs in a context that suggests the possibility of a
future RICO action even if due diligence is not specifically available as an affirmative defense.
189. See supra notes 112, 160 and accompanying text.
190. 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988).
191. Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ings and loan during the time the institution conducted operations. 192
When the savings and loan failed, a civil RICO claim was brought
against two attorneys and the law firm.'"" The complaint alleged
that the defendants had access to confidential financial records, and
therefore, participated in the making of false statements to share-
holders by reviewing and approving false financial statements. 19 As-
suming the law firm did not intend to participate in the fraud, this
RICO claim could have been entirely avoided by adequate attorney
investigation.
Awareness does not, however, completely protect the attorney in
the present environment. Any client representation that involves the
use of a telephone or the mail presents the opportunity for a civil
RICO suit. The present condition of RICO offers attorneys no op-
portunity to avoid such a situation. While this Comment advocates
reform, RICO's reality is that the attorney has no choice but to face
this exposure for the indefinite future.
B. The Settlement Dilemma
If a plaintiff alleges sufficient facts in a civil RICO action to
avoid dismissal, the pressure on the defendant attorney or law firm
to settle may be overwhelming.' 95 The defendant attorney or law
firm must weigh the possible consequences of an unsympathetic jury
and treble-damages award' and the stigma associated with the
racketeer label' 9 7 against the likelihood of success on the merits.
Often, the potential for ruin is so great that a defendant will settle
even a meritless case. This desire to settle is particularly strong for a
law firm that must protect not only its financial position, but its most
precious asset, its reputation.
The leading example of a law firm choosing to settle rather than
litigate is Churchfield Management & Investment Corp. v. Winston
& Strawn.98 Winston & Strawn, one of Chicago's oldest law firms,
provided services to Churchfield over a period of time, including ad-
vice regarding the registration of securities and the preparation of
192. Id. at 1372.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Harrison, supra note 21, at 56; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall notes that "[m]any a prudent
defendant facing ruinous expose will decide to settle even a case with no merit." Id.
196. Harrison, supra note 21, at 56.
197. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
198. Churchfield Management & Investment Corp. v. Winston & Strawn, No. 84-C-
10904, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1988).
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financing statements. 99 Allegedly, Winston & Strawn provided in-
correct advice and failed to make full disclosure in one of
Churchfield's offerings. 00 As a result, Churchfield was prevented
from offering securities in Illinois and eventually went bankrupt. 01
Churchfield filed a civil RICO claim against the law firm.20 2 Win-
ston & Strawn settled the claim for $7.7 million in order to avoid
the possibility of an even larger jury award.
20 3
This settlement dilemma is presented in every civil RICO
case 20 4 when a plaintiff avoids dismissal. Discussing the enormous
pressure to settle, former Supreme Court Justice Marshall has stated
that "[i]t is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for
extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed
to combat. ' 2 5 The practicing attorney remains at the mercy of the
plaintiff whose own attorney is able to cleverly draft a complaint.
Understanding the client's business and the ramifications of the
representation may provide some protection against civil RICO ac-
tions. 20 ' This section should make clear, however, that even an hon-
est, diligent attorney can be victimized by a civil RICO action. The
current situation is most certainly intolerable, but RICO reform is
apparently not imminent. Therefore, attorney awareness remains the
best option for avoiding liability or minimizing the consequences of a
frivolous suit.
V. Conclusion
RICO has evolved beyond Congress' original intentions. Poten-
tial attorney civil liability is one byproduct of this evolution. The
Sedima decision raised fears that attorney liability would become
more widespread.
199. Harrison, supra note 21, at 57.
200. Harrison, supra note 21, at 57.
201. Harrison, supra note 21, at 57.
202. Harrison, supra note 21, at 57. Traditionally, the fact pattern would have sup-
ported a malpractice claim.
203. Settlement Agreement Entered into by Parties, June 9, 1988 at 2, 11. Churchfield
Management & Investment Corp. v. Winston & Strawn, No. 84-C-10904 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12,
1988). But see Harrison, supra note 21, at 56 (setting settlement amount at $7.3 million). The
court approved the settlement agreement on September 12, 1988. Churchfield Management &
Investment Corp. v. Winston & Strawn, No. 84-C-10904 (N.D. 11. Sept. 12, 1988).
204. See Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (case settled for $3.0
million), for further discussion of the role settlement can play in resolving a claim against an
attorney or law firm.
205. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law 69 (1985)).
206. See supra text p. 21-22.
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While Sedima does open a "window of liability," these fears
have not materialized into a voluminous number of suits against at-
torneys. Even though the probability of a RICO suit against any one
attorney is much lowei than the probability of a traditional malprac-
tice case, this fact is of little consolation to the particular attorney
facing a treble damages action and the label "racketeer."
Therefore, an attorney should understand the mechanics of a
civil RICO action as well as the manner in which the statute has
already been used against attorneys. Unfortunately, many attorneys
have only a general awareness of RICO and little or no understand-
ing of their own potential liability. Awareness is essential because of
Congress' inability to reform civil RICO.
If enacted, current proposals for RICO reform will most likely
restrict attorney liability. Attorneys who incur liability under this re-
vised RICO will more likely than not be deserving of both the ac-
companying penalty and reputation loss. The legal community can-
not stand, however, as an entirely innocent party wronged by the
ravages of RICO when attorneys blindly assist individuals who con-
duct questionable business activities.2 0 7 While an attorney has a duty
to vigorously represent a client, this duty is not a license to partici-
pate in a client's fraud on investors or the public. All too often, the
participation in a client's fraud is the result of the attorney's devo-
tion to legal detail at the expense of understanding the practical,
business ramifications of a transaction.
The individual attorney and the larger legal community will
each benefit from increased attorney awareness of potential RICO
liability. The individual attorney benefits by acquiring the knowledge
necessary to prepare for a possible RICO suit. Both the individual
attorney and the larger legal community benefit when the quality of
legal services increases because attorneys understand the conse-
quences of their representation and are able to place this representa-
tion into a meaningful context.
Richard L. Grubb
207. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.

